Selected project-related publications by the members

Bromand, J. (2009). Grenzen des Wissens. Mentis, Paderborn.

Douven, I., & Williamson, T. (2006). Generalizing the lottery paradox. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57, 755-779.

Douven, I. (2009). Can the skepticism debate be resolved? Synthese, 168, 23-52.

Douven, I., Ackerman, R., Elqayam, S., & Teodorescu, K. (2020). Satisficing, meta-reasoning, and the rationality of further deliberation. In S. Elqayam, I. Douven, J. Evans & N. Cruz (Eds.), Logic and Uncertainty in the Human Mind: A Tribute to David E. Over (chapter 2). Routledge, London.

Dunphy, R. (2021). From proto-sceptic to sceptic in Sextus‘ outlines of Pyrrhonism (online first). Apeiron.

Eder, AM. (2019). Evidential probabilities and credences (online first). The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

Eder, AM. (2020). No commitment to the truth (online first). Synthese.

Elqayam, S., Douven, I., Evans, J., & Cruz, N. (Eds.), Logic and Uncertainty in the Human Mind: A Tribute to David E. Over. Routledge, London.

Friedman, J. (2013a). Suspended judgment. Philosophical Studies, 162, 165–181.

Friedman, J. (2013b). Rational agnosticism and degrees of belief. In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 4 (pp. 45-81). Oxford University Press, New York.

Friedman, J. (2013c). Question-directed attitudes. Philosophical Perspectives, 27, 145–174.

Friedman, J. (2017). Why suspend judging?. Noûs, 51, 302–326.

Friedman, J. (2019). Inquiry and belief. Noûs, 53, 296–315.

Kraft, T. (2015). Defending the ignorance view of sceptical scenarios. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 5, 269-295.

Kraft, T. (2017). A new argument for distinguishing rejection and denial. Logique et Analyse, 239, 285-299.

Kraft, T., & Wiegmann, A. (2018). Folk epistemology and epistemic closure. In T. Lombrozo, J. Knobe & S. Nichols (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, 2 (pp. 71-103). Oxford University Press, New York.

Kraft, T., & Rott, H. (2019). Was ist Nichtwissen? In G. Duttge & C. Lenk (Eds.), Das sogenannte Recht auf Nichtwissen: Normatives Fundament und anwendungspraktische Geltungskraft (pp. 21-48). Mentis, Paderborn.

Meylan, A. (2020). Ignorance and its disvalue. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 97, 433–447.

Meylan, A. (2020). Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further (online first). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Meylan, A. (forthcoming). Radical scepticism, stereotypes and the practical stance. In N. Pedersen & L. Moretti (Eds.), Brill Studies in Skepticism, a supplement to the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.

Neth, H. & Gaissmaier, W. (2016). Die Intelligenz einfacher Entscheidungsregeln in einer ungewissen Welt. Controller Magazin, 41, 19–26.

Neth, H. & Gigerenzer, G. (2015). Heuristics: Tools for an uncertain world. In R. Scott & S. Kosslyn (Eds.), Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource (pp. 1–18). Wiley Online Library, New York.

Raleigh, T. (2013). Belief norms and blindspots. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 51, 243-269.

Raleigh, T. (2017). Another argument against uniqueness. The Philosophical Quarterly, 67, 327-346.

Raleigh, T. (2021). Suspending is believing. Synthese, 198, 2449–2474.

Ranalli, C., & van Woudenberg, R. (2019). Collective ignorance: An information theoretic account. Synthese, 198, 4731-4750.

Rosa, L. (2019). Logical principles of agnosticism. Erkenntnis, 84, 1263–1283.

Rosa, L. (2020). Suspending judgment the correct way (online first). Inquiry.

Rosa, L. (2021). Rational requirements for suspended judgment. Philosophical Studies, 178, 385-406.

Rosenkranz, S. (2003). Wright on vagueness and agnosticism. Mind, 112, 449-463.

Rosenkranz, S. (2007). Agnosticism as a third stance. Mind, 116, 55–104.

Rosenkranz, S. (2018). The structure of justification. Mind, 127, 309-338.

Rott, H. (2009). Degrees all the way down: Beliefs, non-beliefs and disbeliefs. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (Eds.), Degrees of Belief (pp.301-339). Springer, Dodrecht.

Rott, H. (2017a). Stability and scepticism in the modelling of doxastic states: Probabilities and plain beliefs. Minds and Machines, 27, 167-197.

Rott, H. (2017b). Negative doxastic voluntarism and the concept of belief. Synthese, 194, 2695-2720.

Rott, H. (2019). Unstable knowledge, unstable belief. Logos & Episteme, 10, 395-407.

Staffel, J. (2019). Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes. Philosophical Issues, 29, 281-294.

Staffel, J. (2020). Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality. Oxford University Press, New York, USA.

Vlasits, J., & Vogt, K. (Eds.) (2020). Epistemology after Sextus Empiricus. Oxford University Press, New York, USA.

Vlasits, J. (2020). Pyrrhonism and the Dialectical Methods: The Aims and Argument of Outlines of Pyrrhonism II. History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, 23, 225-252.

Wagner, V. (forthcoming). Epistemic dilemma and epistemic conflict. In K. McCain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup (Eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.

Wagner, V. (2021). Agnosticism as settled indecision (online first). Philosophical Studies.

Zinke, A., & Freitag, W. (2020). Statistics and suspension. Philosophical Studies, 177, 2877-2880.

Zinke, A. (2021). Rational suspension (online first). Theoria.

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