Selected project-related publications by the members
- Bromand, J. (2009). Grenzen des Wissens. Mentis, Paderborn.
- Douven, I., & Williamson, T. (2006). Generalizing the lottery paradox. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57, 755-779.
- Douven, I. (2009). Can the skepticism debate be resolved? Synthese, 168, 23-52.
- Douven, I., Ackerman, R., Elqayam, S., & Teodorescu, K. (2020). Satisficing, meta-reasoning, and the rationality of further deliberation. In S. Elqayam, I. Douven, J. Evans & N. Cruz (Eds.), Logic and Uncertainty in the Human Mind: A Tribute to David E. Over (chapter 2). Routledge, London.
- Dunphy, R. (2022). From proto-sceptic to sceptic in Sextus‘ outlines of Pyrrhonism. Apeiron, 55, 455-484.
- Dutant, J., & Rosenkranz, S. (2020) Inexact knowledge 2.0, Inquiry, 63:8, 812-830.
- Eder, AM. (2019). Evidential probabilities and credences (online first). The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
- Eder, AM. (2021). No commitment to the truth. Synthese, 198, 7449-7472.
- Elqayam, S., Douven, I., Evans, J., & Cruz, N. (Eds.), Logic and Uncertainty in the Human Mind: A Tribute to David E. Over. Routledge, London.
- Friedman, J. (2013a). Suspended judgment. Philosophical Studies, 162, 165–181.
- Friedman, J. (2013b). Rational agnosticism and degrees of belief. In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 4 (pp. 45-81). Oxford University Press, New York.
- Friedman, J. (2013c). Question-directed attitudes. Philosophical Perspectives, 27, 145–174.
- Friedman, J. (2017). Why suspend judging?. Noûs, 51, 302–326.
- Friedman, J. (2019). Inquiry and belief. Noûs, 53, 296–315.
- Friedman, J. (2019). Checking again. Philosophical Issues, 29, 84-96.
- Friedman, J. (forthcoming). Zetetic Epistemology. In Baron Reed & A. K. Flowerree (eds.), Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere. Routledge.
- Friedman, J. (forthcoming). Committed Neutrality in The Rational Mind. Critical Notice of Scott Sturgeon’s The Rational Mind. Analysis.
- Kraft, T. (2015). Defending the ignorance view of sceptical scenarios. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 5, 269-295.
- Kraft, T. (2017). A new argument for distinguishing rejection and denial. Logique et Analyse, 239, 285-299.
- Kraft, T., & Wiegmann, A. (2018). Folk epistemology and epistemic closure. In T. Lombrozo, J. Knobe & S. Nichols (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, 2 (pp. 71-103). Oxford University Press, New York.
- Kraft, T., & Rott, H. (2019). Was ist Nichtwissen? In G. Duttge & C. Lenk (Eds.), Das sogenannte Recht auf Nichtwissen: Normatives Fundament und anwendungspraktische Geltungskraft (pp. 21-48). Mentis, Paderborn.
- Meylan, A. (2020). Ignorance and its disvalue. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 97, 433–447.
- Meylan, A. (2021). Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103, 199-216.
- Meylan, A. (forthcoming). Radical scepticism, stereotypes and the practical stance. In N. Pedersen & L. Moretti (Eds.), Brill Studies in Skepticism, a supplement to the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
- Mousavi, S., Meder, B., Neth, H., & Kheirandish, R. (2017). Heuristics: fast, frugal, and smart. In Morris Altman (Ed.), Handbook of Behavioral Economics and Smart Decision-Making: Rational Decision-Making within the Bounds of Reason (pp. 101-118). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Neth, H., & Gaissmaier, W. (2016). Die Intelligenz einfacher Entscheidungsregeln in einer ungewissen Welt. Controller Magazin, 41, 19–26.
- Neth, H. & Gigerenzer, G. (2015). Heuristics: Tools for an uncertain world. In R. Scott & S. Kosslyn (Eds.), Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource (pp. 1–18). Wiley Online Library, New York.
- Raleigh, T. (2013). Belief norms and blindspots. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 51, 243-269.
- Raleigh, T. (2017). Another argument against uniqueness. The Philosophical Quarterly, 67, 327-346.
- Raleigh, T. (2021). Suspending is believing. Synthese, 198, 2449–2474.
- Ranalli, C., & van Woudenberg, R. (2019). Collective ignorance: An information theoretic account. Synthese, 198, 4731-4750.
- Ranalli, C. (2020). The puzzle of philosophical testimony. European Journal of Philosophy, 28, 142-163.
- Ranalli, C., & Lagewaard, T. (2022). Deep Disagreement (Part 2): Epistemology of Deep Disagreement (online first). Philosophy Compass.
- Rosa, L. (2019). Logical principles of agnosticism. Erkenntnis, 84, 1263–1283.
- Rosa, L. (2020). Suspending judgment the correct way (online first). Inquiry.
- Rosa, L. (2021). Rational requirements for suspended judgment. Philosophical Studies, 178, 385-406.
- Rosa, L. (2022). Coherence and Knowability. The Philosophical Quarterly, 72, 960-978.
- Rosenkranz, S. (2003). Wright on vagueness and agnosticism. Mind, 112, 449-463.
- Rosenkranz, S. (2007). Agnosticism as a third stance. Mind, 116, 55–104.
- Rosenkranz, S. (2018). The structure of justification. Mind, 127, 309-338.
- Rosenkranz, S. (2021). Justification as ignorance: An essay in epistemology. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Rott, H. (2009). Degrees all the way down: Beliefs, non-beliefs and disbeliefs. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (Eds.), Degrees of Belief (pp. 301-339). Springer, Dodrecht.
- Rott, H. (2017a). Stability and scepticism in the modelling of doxastic states: Probabilities and plain beliefs. Minds and Machines, 27, 167-197.
- Rott, H. (2017b). Negative doxastic voluntarism and the concept of belief. Synthese, 194, 2695-2720.
- Rott, H. (2019). Unstable knowledge, unstable belief. Logos & Episteme, 10, 395-407.
- Schuster, D. (2021). Forms and Norms of Indecision in Argumentation Theory. In Deontic Logic and Normative Systems, 15th International Conference, DEON 2020/2021. College Publications. Edited by Fenrong Liu, Alessandra Marra, Paul Portner, Frederik Van De Putte. pp. 394–413.
- Staffel, J. (2019). Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes. Philosophical Issues, 29, 281-294.
- Staffel, J. (2020). Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality. Oxford University Press, New York, USA.
- Staffel, J. (2021). Transitional Attitudes and the Unmooring View of Higher-Order Evidence. Noûs, 1-24.
- Vlasits, J., & Vogt, K. (Eds.) (2020). Epistemology after Sextus Empiricus. Oxford University Press, New York, USA.
- Vlasits, J. (2020). Pyrrhonism and the Dialectical Methods: The Aims and Argument of Outlines of Pyrrhonism II. History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, 23, 225-252.
- Wagner, V. (2021). Epistemic dilemma and epistemic conflict. In K. McCain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup (Eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (chapter 4). Routledge.
- Wagner, V. (2022). Agnosticism as settled indecision. Philosophical Studies, 179, 671-697.
- Zinke, A., & Freitag, W. (2020). Statistics and suspension. Philosophical Studies, 177, 2877-2880.
- Zinke, A. (2021). Rational suspension. Theoria, 87, 1050-1066.
Thinking About Suspension 